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Naturally, the weather: 
On complexity, philosophy, and world systems 
Peter Trnka 
[Yhe dynamics [of the weather system] can be modeled as a stable linear multivari- 
ate process driven by geographically coherent white noise. 
US Center for Diagnostic Climatology 
[Meteorological phenomena] admit of several different explanations for their com- 
ing to be and several different accounts of their existence. 
Epicurus 
. . . the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the 
nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two 
of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together: So the nature of War, 
consisteth not in actual1 fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all 
the time there is no asurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE. 
Thomas Hobbes 
I1 y va de la Terre, dans sa totalitt, comme des hommes, dans leur ensemble. L'his- 
toire globale entre dans la nature; la nature globale entre dans I'histoire: voila de 
1'inCdit en philosophie. 
Michel Serres 
What can we say, and what can we not say, about the weather? The answer mat- 
ters, then and now, for the survival and health of human life and culture, and life 
in general. Extreme meteorological events-floods, droughts, tsunamis, hurri- 
canes, and tornadoes-as well as greater climatological changes, such as global 
warming, form the critical margin of weather phenomena from this point of view. 
Modern, technological adaptation to  nature, such as the production of closed 
dwelling places with artificial environments, has not diminished the danger of the 
weather. Technological production is not an independent controlling variable on 
natural systems, such as the world weather system, but a set of functional vari- 
ables within the environment. We have failed, fortunately, in attempting to  escape 
from our subservience to weather and we have irritated that from which we fled. 
Naturally then, because we dwell precariously on the earth and are subservient 
to  and in the control of weather, the weather matters for culture and life in gen- 
eral. What weather is and how it can be known are first questions of philosophy. 
How do we think through what we do not know in order to  cope with the 
vagaries of weather? Weather readings may be split into those that seek explana- 
tions of extreme phenomena in what is simpler and more familiar, and those that 
maintain the complexity of the immanent, of the phenomena themselves, as some- 
thing thinkable. The former is the philosophy of transcendence or theology; the 
latter is the naturalist alternative. 
Naturally the weather, then, to think the place of philosophy in nature and the 
value of nature, to think the difference between philosophies of transcendence and 
immanence, to show how a philosophy of immanence, that is to say, a naturalism, 
bestows or recognizes value in nature or nature's phenomena. 
Naturally, because the weather occupies a place not like we do, as a living thing 
residing in a dwelling, protected from the outside, but as the outside, the liminal 
system that runs across the skin of the world, connecting the heavens with the sub- 
terranean, always moving even when as still as still, one thing only because its 
many manifestations or events cannot be split off from each other and considered 
to perdure on their own. 
Naturally, the weather from the perspective of philosophy and nature: the 
weather today poses a challenge for human practice, in the effects that we have on 
the global system and the counter-effects on us, and a challenge for thinking of the 
nature of thinking, given the complexity and global status of this strange brew 
that passes for a thing. 
Naturally the weather for a textual reason as well: several key works in the philos- 
ophy of nature use weather as their paradigmatic example or emblem: Epicurus' let- 
ter to Pythocles, Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan, and Michel Serres' Le contrat naturel. 
Each addresses the issue of how we perceive the weather and relates this question to 
the broader subject of the value of nature from an immanent or naturalist point of 
view. Each of the texts sees philosophy as a practice mediating a relatively fixed 
human nature and the changeable weather.' Epicurus' tale of nature emphasizes the 
individual ethic that should be developed from a correct appreciation of nature; 
Hobbes' tale is explicitly social and political, arguing for justice as a withdrawal 
from nature; finally, Serres brings together the antagonism between society and 
nature in a reading of their conjunction in time and the weather (du temps).* 
I. The Nature of Weather Today 
My central claim concerning the weather may appear contradictory: we have and 
have not progressed in our understanding of weather phenomena since ancient 
Greek times. Much depends on the meaning of 'phenomena' and 'understanding.' 
Today we are more aware of the variables relevant to the phenomena or patterns of 
behaviour of the weather, and we are 'more able, in a systematic and quantifiable 
way, to predict and to control such behaviours. Yet we are fundamentally in the 
same position as the Greeks since such understanding of weather phenomena has 
not eliminated our ignorance of the overall nature of weather and we are still under 
its behest, notwithstanding fantastic increases in our ability to withdraw from or 
ward off the forces of the outside. We have thus made great advances in under- 
standing, which I wish to outline below as they show the complexity of such 
knowledge, while remaining at the level of the phenomena, phenomena to which 
we are still subservient. The meaning of understanding and the nature of the appro- 
priate response or attitude to limitations of understanding are still problems today, 
as they were in the more fideistic culture of the Greeks within which Epicurus 
developed his naturalist philosophy. Our situation is like that of more knowledge- 
able and powerful Greeks, who find that after all their scientific and technological 
progress they are still under the sway of powers they do not understand. 
I describe contemporary meteorology and climatology this way, first, since the 
fact that the global human population is subservient to, dependent upon, and 
threatened by the weather is hardly contestable (putting aside those who believe 
abandonment of the earth is an answer to natural limitations to human life). While 
technological and engineering advances allow a significant proportion of us to live 
in warm, dry, and comfortable circumstances, this is not true generally of people 
across the world. Disparities between high-energy consumption living, necessary 
for the creation of stable internal environments, and the mass of more traditional 
and pre-technological conditions of life, especially in the Third World, contribute 
to our collective frailty in the face of nature. Global warming is the central and 
frightening example of such a case. I shall focus on a distinct problem, the appar- 
ent increase in more traditional types of natural disasters, such as thunderstorms, 
which impact more severely on those less encased in hermetic environments, 
though not exclusively so. While such disasters are more familiar and traditional, 
their causes are as difficult to pin down as the novel and unfamiliar event of global 
warming. Indeed the two are related: global atmospheric heat is a key determinant 
of storm activity. I choose to focus on storm activity for several reasons: increases 
in storm activity promise to be a major threat on life; storms have been attended 
to, philosophically, in the past; and, finally, the irreducible multiplicity of factors 
and striking temporality of extreme weather events pose the epistemological and 
ontological problems of thought of nature acutely. 
The Center for Diagnostic Climatology, part of the U.S. Government's National 
Oceanographic institutes, affiliated with the University of Colorado, has a man- 
date to mediate meteorology and climatology, that is to say, knowledge of short 
and long term weather patterns, moving in the order of seasons to decades. The 
CDC mission is to "to advance understanding and predictions of weather and cli- 
mate variations on time scales ranging from a week to centuries."3 The satisfaction 
of this mission includes as central components the "elucidat[ion of] fundamental 
processes governing climate phenomena such as droughts, floods, and the El Nino 
Southern Oscillation (ENSO), and to identify the causes of longer-term (decadal to 
centennial) climate variations."4 The types of fundamental processes and causes at 
stake are complex. 
How does the CDC, a leading scientific institution in the field, go about the 
study of fundamental processes and causes in climate change and extreme 
weather? Why it does so is clear: the human dimensions of extreme meteorological 
and climate phenomena are numerous, and go far beyond the deaths and damage 
wreaked by storms. The immediate harm of extreme weather events, including 
storm systems, be they too much water (floods), wind (hurricanes, tornadoes), or 
heat (forest-fires, drought), is born by humans, animals, and the environment in 
general, including the developed environment. The aftermath of such events is 
often worse in terms of human and animal death and suffering, largely due to the 
spread of disease: the corpses and waste spread by extreme weather are a clear 
danger in their own right; the breakdown of waterworks, heating and cooling sys- 
tems, food distribution, etc., pose larger-scale human catastrophes. 
The implication of extreme weather events in natural resource-based engineering 
and technological enterprises is multifaceted and forms one of the complex prob- 
lems for longer-term, synthetic weather research. The human dimensions include 
"population and other demographic changes, technological change, economic 
structures and market forces, political-social institutions and their interaction and 
societal values."5 Most importantly for weather formation are human land and 
water usage. Human use of water forms one small part of the overall system rele- 
vant to weather formation, that is to say, the hydrologic cycle, which, as CDC puts 
it, "cuts across all of the.. . themes [of US oceanographic and climatological 
research] and provides the link between these themes and human dimen~ions."~ 
The all-encompassing character of a consideration of the hydrologic cycle, while 
daunting as any theory of the whole is likely to be, cannot be evaded in approach- 
ing narrower problems, such as hurricane forecasting. In attempting to  solve the 
narrower problem one need not, of course, come to a definitive and precise com- 
prehension of the whole. Yet middle and long-term weather predictions cannot 
ignore the whole, and doing so may also impact on short-term predictions. 
Examining the various modelling techniques used by CDC and others in 
weather prediction shows how a theory of the whole is useful. Predictions in cli- 
matology use observational evidence, modelling techniques, or a combination of 
both. The standard form of modelling technique in climatology is a linear one, 
with computer simulations of weather forces played against stipulated parameters. 
As CDC explains, "[iln the forward problem, sample geophysical variables are run 
through a forward radiative transfer model, along with specific information about 
the satellite instrument such as the instrumental error characteristics and spectral 
response functions, and the outputs are simulated radiances."' The assumption of 
the technique is that instrumental parameters plus randomly generated geophysi- 
cal variables are sufficient to provide useful information concerning potential 
weather patterns. Such a technique is in line with traditional assumptions concern- 
ing cause-effect relations and cognitive mapping. 
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The originality of CDC's approach lies in the fusion of past observational data, 
modelling techniques, and information theory, in a way that challenges the tradi- 
tional model of cognitive mapping and suggests a new model for weather. In place 
of the linear or forward model, CDC develops an inverse-linear technique: "The 
inverse problem begins with the actual satellite observations. These observations 
are then used in an inverse radiative transfer model to produce retrievals of geo- 
physical variables."8 That is, we should start from actual observations-an obvious 
truth of empiricism-and our modelling techniques should be coupled to them. 
The full implications of this approach go much farther, however, and show some- 
thing of the difficulty in coupling observation with cognitive mapping and the 
complexity of empiricism. Briefly, the coupling of observations and models 
requires a shift from a more piecemeal, instrument-based technique to a full infor- 
mation theory; from "an idea of what performance we might anticipate from a 
given instrumentn9 to a complete idea of what is likely to happen given our best 
guess of how all the variables involved may interact. Some detailed explication is 
required to give fuller specification of the meaning and importance of this shift in 
thinking the weather, and its potential significance for science and philosophy. 
A restatement of our problem may help to clarify the issue at  stake between the 
two approaches to modelling. Weather, including extreme weather, is affected by a 
highly complex set of variables. One may attempt to understand and predict the 
weather by trying to think together all the relevant variables, but this is impossible 
given that one has to think about everything to figure out the meaning of a partic- 
ular within that global system, a particular that itself may affect the whole. One 
may also proceed by identifying significant variables and relating them to their 
potential predecessors and consequents.1° A significant or informative signal is 
something that correlates with but is distinct from the weather patterns one is try- 
ing to approximate. In the case of extreme weather events, sea surface temperature 
(SST) is the central variable. At the interface of all three phases of the hydrologic 
cycle, mirroring the involvement of all water phases in hurricanes and other 
extreme weather events, sea surface temperature is a meeting-ground upon which 
the various variables pertinent to weather are played out. 
Even in such a simplified account, one may see the difficulty of thinking 
weather. Combining observation with modelling requires, to begin with, some 
notion of what is and is not a sign, that is to say, what counts as data. Such issues 
are accounted for by the piecemeal, linear modelling method: some agreement on 
what the instrument measures and when it is in error, when a purported signal is 
in fact noise, needs settling. The account of the relation of signal to noise is differ- 
ent in the inverse linear modelling method. From a linear approach which deals 
with noise primarily as an epistemological issue of the error of a measuring appa- 
ratus, we move to a theory that includes noise within the parameters of what is 
being modelled, and necessarily so if the coupling of observation and modelling is 
to work. Let us look at the technical explanation of this procedure. 
CDC explains that Linear Inverse Modelling is a "method for extracting the 
dynamical parameters of a system from data."ll What this means is that model 
parameters are not confined to instrumental configurations, either in the sense of 
measuring devices or computer models; rather, parameters themselves are some- 
how 'read off' or 'from' past events. The point of such a 'realist' approximation of 
parameters is to have a more probable estimate of the likely event, taking every- 
thing into account, that is to say, all variables as they have played out in the past 
(given our data) and as they are expressed in significant variables (for example, 
SSTs). The opposing, linear technique is based in simplification: assuming such 
and such parameters, this is a likely outcome. The generalist tack of the inverse 
approach attempts to think the relation between past events, current parameters, 
and future outcomes, and in doing so, everything needs to be considered, though it 
cannot, of course, all be thought at the same time. Considering everything means a 
different relation between noise and signal; from an approach wherein signal is 
everything that is not instrumental noise, we have an approach that recognizes, as 
a real or ontological feature of the event, noise (as a concatenation of unsorted or 
folded relevant variables) and its relation to signal. 
CDC's central hypothesis concerning inverse modelling is that "the dynamics [of 
the weather system] can be modelled as a stable linear multivariate process driven 
by geographically coherent white noise."12 How does the difference in modelling 
technique bear upon the variables that are accounted for in making climatological 
predictions? The theoretical advantages of the inverse over the linear model are 
fairly clear, even though they may not be born out in superior predictive power. 
The inverse model is multivariate, with the implication of several variables 
expressed in the noise function. That is, the linear, univariate models use instru- 
ment functions to model the behaviour of a system given one variation. Such tech- 
niques are, according to CDC, "unable to predict either the growth or the changes 
of sign" in a complex system across periods; they "merely have the initial condi- 
tion decay to climatology, possibly with different decay rates at different points, 
over the domain."l3 The synthetic capacity of the linear inverse model is due to the 
function of the white noise variable. Geographic white noise expresses seasonally 
dependent stochastic forcing: "the observed phase locking to the annual cycle is 
transmitted to the SST anomalies through a seasonally dependent variance of the 
stochastic forcing."14 
To reiterate: the linear inverse model is theoretically superior in that it (a) 
accounts for many variables, not just one, (b) synthesizes the activity of variables 
upon each other through the function of noise, and (c) plots together periods or 
phases of the system through variation in the noise function ("seasonally dependent 
variance of the stochastic forcing"). Stochastic forcing is the only seasonally depen- 
dent variable in the model, thus serving as the single fulcrum or nodal point for the 
concatenation of past variables and their non-linear effect on a current phase.ls 
CDC "emphasize" the singularity of the seasonal nature of the stochastic forcing 
and "that it is neither the deterministic dynamics alone nor the stochastic forcing 
alone but the interplay of the two which accounts for the observed growth of El 
Nino events and their phase locking to the annual cycle."l6 The white noise, it 
should be noted, "represents the broadband non-linear dynamics affecting the more 
slowly varying 'deterministic' (and predictable) part of a measured signal"l7 and 
"drives" the stable linear features of the Indo-Pacific ocean-atmosphere system. 
The claims of such a modelling technique with respect to extreme weather 
events are major, but the limitations should not be understated. First, the actual 
predictive power is equal to  but not better than the linear model and, in many 
cases, no better than "the simplest possible linear forecast."l8 Second, when deal- 
ing with noise, or properly, geographically stable white noise, as a variable expres- 
sive of the implication of many past variables, we run into the problem of treating 
the background as a signal, of noise as information. How do we distinguish mean- 
ingful from unmeaningful noise? Carrying our doubt further, what limits does 
noise, as a function in understanding and prediction, place upon the very ability to 
understand and predict? Specifically CDC is concerned with distinguishing season- 
ally dependent white noise from "unpredictable noise," itself "strongly affected by 
the behaviour of synoptic weather systems as they approach and decay in these 
regions of diffluent flow. Much of its unpredictability therefore ultimately arises 
from the unpredictability of synoptic weather systems."19 The unpredictability here 
is in part due to our ignorance concerning "eddy-mean flow interactions in these 
regions (as well as of the eddies themselves)."20 
There is much that we still do not know, especially as concerns the implication 
of many variables in the past and the structure of their influence, as noise, upon 
the future. To this end, "taking into account the detailed spatial and temporal 
structure of the [stochastic] forcing" is needed. From the other side, synoptic 
weather systems are "strongly affected by the slow variations of the background 
flow in space and time. The variations of the storm tracks,21 in turn, affect the 
variations of the background flow, again in both space and time." To make clear 
the complexity and difficulty of this problem, CDC admits that "a proper under- 
standing and modelling of this interaction remains an outstanding problem in 
meteorology."22 Much attention needs to be paid to the skill and error of forecast- 
ing procedures and calculations-forecasting forecasting skills of weather systems 
-and a significant part of what such attention seeks to distinguish is the difference 
between seasonally dependent stochastic forcing and the "inherent noise" of the 
atmosphere-ocean system.23 
I have gone into some detail concerning one key aspect of CDC's modelling pro- 
cedure and it should be apparent that much is elided. In considering fundamental 
issues such as the geographic and temporal variables of noise, the reciprocal effects 
of storm tracks and space-time flow upon each other, and the character of the 
ocean-atmosphere interaction, we meet questions of great magnitude and com- 
plexity. For example, on the behaviour of clouds, the CDC writes that "[clurrent 
computer power permits explicit simulation of multiple clouds for multiple cloud 
lifetimes" and yet we lack "a model strategy under which the modelled cloud 
ensemble is not controlled by lateral boundary conditions ('forcing') or initial con- 
ditions."24 We are back at the full hydrologic cycle and the human effects on climate 
change, themselves a complex, multivariate dimension of the ocean-atmosphere sys- 
tem. As CDC puts it, "[tlhe exchange of chemically and radiatively active trace 
gases, such as ozone and water vapour, between the stratosphere and troposphere 
alters the chemical and radiative balances in both regions, which would, in turn, 
influence the radiative forcing of the global climate system. A better understanding 
of the physics and dynamics of stratosphere-troposphere exchange.. . is thus critical 
to understanding and predicting global climate change and assessing the climate 
impacts of human acti~ities. '~~ Much is known, but the complexity of the complete 
system maintains large pools of ignorance, or undifferentiated noise.26 
11. Epicurus, Naturalism, and the Interpretation of Storms 
We have seen something of what our highly advanced, complex sciences tell us 
today of weather systems. I wish to emphasize two points. First, that meteorology 
and climatology are necessarily transdisciplinary and their object, if we wish to con- 
tinue speaking so, is a world object or global event-~ystern.2~ Second, while our pre- 
dictive, calculative, and comprehensive powers have improved dramatically over 
time, and especially in the last century, in some respects we are still primitive in our 
relations with the heavens. The choice between transcendent or immanent explana- 
tions remains. Some still seek theological reductions of complexity and others 
replay what I shall argue is an Epicurean attitude toward the complex or unknown 
in nature, that is, a detachment from reduction and an affirmation of multiplicity. I 
shall explore Epicurus' letter to Pythocles to better understand naturalism and its 
relation to the heavens, and, further, to make precise the character of detachment 
or freedom from disturbance which is the main practical upshot of such a thought. 
Epicurus begins the letter to Pythocles, one of three outstanding letters and a 
major source of our documentation concerning Epicurus' teachings, with a cou- 
pling of the aim of philosophy and a study of meteorology. Meteorology is a part 
of 'true physics' and the study of the latter is crucial, according to Epicurus, to the 
end of proper practical philosophy, namely, a blessed life. As the term indicates, 
'blessedness' requires something out of the agent's control. For Aristotle, similarly, 
happiness was properly attributed only after the death of an agent, since a crisis at 
the end of one's life or after (for one's family or friends) cancels or diminishes it. 
One must, accordingly, be fortunate to  be happy. Epicurus' philosophy, while 
promising perhaps more than Aristotle concerning the consequences of the right 
practice of philosophy, should be thought within this relation to fortune. 
Epicurus urges us to think physics, and specifically meteorology in the case of 
the letter to Pythocles, in order to "contribute to a blessed life," a goal which he 
glosses as "freedom from disturbance and a secure conviction."2~ Let the gods 
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smile upon you: receive a good spell of weather; avoid the wrath of the heavens: 
steer clear of turbulent air or water. The notion that the heavens, as the abode of 
the gods, are the source of change in the weather is not Epicurus' doctrine. Rather, 
abstention from explanation in terms of gods contributes to our blessedness. 
Meteorology is worthy of study because it shows us how to resist bad forms of 
theological explanation (which eventually lead to disturbance, while appearing to 
cancel it) and how to produce good forms of naturalist explanation. Differences in 
types of explanation are linked to different attitudes to the world and thus the bet- 
ter attitude, that is to say, one which is in closer alignment with nature, is more 
likely (though not guaranteed) to bring us happiness. What then is naturalism and 
how is it distinct from philosophies of transcendence or theology? 
Epicurus begins his letter with a purported fact concerning the phenomena of 
meteorology: according to our sense-perception (as distinct from judgement), 
meteorological phenomena "admit of several different explanations for their com- 
ing to be and several different accounts of their e ~ i s t e n c e . " ~ ~  Epicurus holds this 
seemingly simple claim to be a striking fact. Why? Epicurus insists on beginning 
with observation, but this is not enough; one must hesitate in the plurality of 
observation before passing judgement. To begin with observation is easy, if not a 
truism; to begin with a phenomenon and give it its due is another matter. Such an 
attitude does 'justice' or is 'fair' to the phenomena; it is "the manner called for by 
the phenomena."3O Any other attitude places us in "tumult" and is formed by 
"irrationality and groundless opinion."3I 
The question of what we are observing is not an easy one. Appearances are not 
events. The phenomena themselves are not apparent for we do not observe 'them7 
but only their various signs: "Some of the phenomena which are within our expe- 
rience and are observed just as they really are do provide signs applicable to what 
comes to pass in meteorology, but we cannot observe meteorological phenomena; 
for they can occur in several different ways."32 The emphasis on possibility, the 
openness of what past events may explain a current state and what variety of 
futures may follow a complex present, is continued throughout the letter. Epicurus 
writes that it is important to maintain "a firm hold on what is possible."33 He also 
names his view "the method of several different e~planations."3~ This method is 
contrasted with "the method of unique explanations."35 He associates the latter 
with theology and argues that "the nature of the divine not be brought to bear on 
this at all" as it leads us to simplify or seek the unique where there are ma11y.3~ 
There are several examples of the ways in which a meteorological phenomenon 
may be caused and accounted for. The example of lightning is as good as any: 
And lightning flashes similarly occur in several different ways; for the atomic configu- 
ration which produces fire is squeezed out by the friction and collision of clouds and 
so generates a lightning flash; it could also occur as a result of the wind making the 
sort of bodies which cause this luminescence flash forth from the clouds; and by the 
squeezing of clouds when they are compressed, either by each other or by the winds; 
and by the inclusion in them of the light scattered from the heavenly bodies, which is 
then driven together by the motion of the clouds and winds and is expelled by the 
clouds; or as a result of the filtering of the finest form of light through the clouds and 
as a result of its movement; and by the conflagration of the wind which occurs because 
of the vigour of its movement and its extreme compression; and because the clouds are 
broken by the winds and the atoms which produce fire are then expelled and so pro- 
duce the presentations of the lightning flash. And it will be easy to see that it could 
happen in a great many ways, for him who clings always to the phenomena and who is 
able to contemplate together what is similar to the phen~mena.~' 
There is no doubt that we know, in detailed ways, far more about the particular 
processes involved in lightning-the phenomenon-than does Epicurus. But this is 
not the main point. Climatologists today are challenged not primarily by the par- 
ticularities of the processes involved in extreme weather events, which are largely 
known, but in how they come together, in the real events that are likely given the 
array of natural necessities and contingencies. Stated another way, our understand- 
ing of physically necessary laws and processes is now greatly advanced though our 
thinking of their concatenation is still rudimentary. 
To insist that scientific explanation is (always) reduction to invariable law is a 
mode of the movement away from phenomena to  the theological method of 
'unique explanations.' One way of conceiving the value of nature is to practice 
what Epicurus calls "heeding the call of the phenomena," what I referred to above 
as "doing justice to the appearances". The reductive move is a move away from 
what appears, usually to some other underlying or overarching process or set of 
properties that is held to account for what has occurred or been witnessed. The 
reductive move, if it is not to succumb to some infinite regress (the simpler 
requires explanation in still simpler terms, etc.) relies upon a belief in some pri- 
mary or fundamental reality, other than the phenomena.38 
Reduction is abstraction. The reductive method abstracts from the phenomena to 
the singular law, form, or essence that such phenomena are held to express or make 
manifest. Epicurus, on the contrary, 'stays' with the phenomena; he is pluralist 
rather than monist, positing many (not merely possible but) probable and real 
accounts of what is happening. Transfer from one 'level' of the real to another is, 
accordingly, conceived as a journey or transformation, a dislocation, and not as a 
transcendence in the sense of a movement to the 'truly real,' be it above (as in theol- 
ogy) or below (as in scientism). The real is held to be polyvalent, complex, and full 
of events, rather than a repetition or revelation of a singular structure. For both 
these reasons, it makes sense to maintain the integrity of the phenomena which 
have been witnessed when coming up with an account, if, that is, the particularity 
of what has been witnessed is the interesting thing, and not the elucidation of a pre- 
conceived theory. 
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A 'phenomenon: as Epicurus writes above, need not be confined to what is 
directly given; indeed, the peculiarity of meteorological phenomena is that they are 
not immediately given but are only indicated by other phenomena and in such a 
way that many meteorological phenomena are possible within the same indices. A 
phenomenon is complex, but within the sensible; as something that appears, it 
may be the phenomenon of direct sense (the scene upon which it appears allows it 
to be seen, touched, tasted, smelt, or heard) but it may also require inference. We 
know already that the inference is not unique and necessary, in that there are many 
possible phenomena that may justly be inferred, but how may an inferred existent 
be conceived as a phenomenon? This is where the method of reduction and the 
method of multiple explanations show their central difference: the method of 
reduction moves, outside of time, from one level to a deeper or higher one, while 
the pluralist method connects occurrences across time. An event such as a light- 
ning flash is not, accordingly, a singular object, but an expression or development 
of other events, which happened or will happen this way this time, but not again.39 
Epicurus promises, at the end of a proper understanding of meteorology and the 
rest of true physics, through the practice of his philosophy, a happiness or blessed- 
ness notorious for its appearance of quietude and removal from life. Does Epicurus 
advocate a transcendence from complication as the end of philosophy? No, and 
understanding why not will serve our further inquiry into the nature of weather 
phenomena (distinguishing between extreme and calm patterns), and, by compari- 
son, the nature of human relations (distinguishing between war and peace). 
Blessedness or calm, for Epicurus is the result of practical philosophy, though 
philosophy cannot guarantee its provision. The right attitude and thought may pre- 
pare one for a calm life; unless the view of calm as transcendence from, or rising 
above, life is correct, the right attitude and thought are insufficient nevertheless. 
Epicurus explains blessedness and calm in terms of freedom from disturbance. Is 
such freedom an absence of motion and sense? Are motion and sense themselves 
equivalent to disturbance, leading eventually to a Platonic philosophy of death 
where the only peace is a rising above of the chaos of particulars and impressions? 
Epicurus' end of philosophy is rightly a hedonism and not an asceticism or religious 
transcendence. Calm and blessedness, accordingly, are forms of pleasure, the high- 
est form of pleasure. Higher and lower here are not merely matters of intensity, for 
pleasure is not a brute physical sensation but itself a complex human re~ponse.~O 
Epicurus identifies two types of pleasure: 'in motion' (kinetic) and 'static' or 'sta- 
ble' (katastematic); and the latter has two sorts, aponia and ataraxia. The meaning 
of aponia and ataraxia as the higher types of pleasures and as 'static' needs careful 
interpretation. Gisela Striker argues that the text on these matters is "desperately 
d i f f i ~ u l t " ~ ~  and often "quoted out of context," yet she offers a paraphrase of Epicu- 
rus' key passage42 as follows: aponia and ataraxia "are states of pleasure, but the 
joy and delight that come with them manifest themselves in motion, that is, in par- 
ticular episodes of pleasure and en j~ymen t . "~~  Describing aponia and ataraxia as 
"states" allows us to distinguish them from "static" somethings, which is impor- 
tant for conceiving calm as this-worldly or immanent. One may have states without 
believing in absolute stasis; a state may be relatively stable without being absolutely 
free of motion. Put simply, the choice is between a relative calm within life and an 
absolute freedom from disturbance in death.44 Freedom from disturbance is, 
accordingly, consistent with motion and a certain kind of pleasure: 
[I]f one grants Epicurus the claim that pleasure is constituted by undisturbed affec- 
tion, one might find it plausible to say that a hedonist should aim a t  those states of 
body and mind that make life enjoyable regardless of what one takes pleasure in, 
except for the few disturbances that will arise from unavoidable pains. And if the 
connection between states of freedom and pleasurable experiences is as close as Epi- 
curus' theory would make it out to be, one might also be willing to accept the termi- 
nological move of calling these states pleasures as well, albeit objectless ones.45 
The calm or blessedness advocated by Epicurus is not a freedom from the 
vagaries of life but a freedom from unnecessary disturbance in life. It directs us to 
the absence of disturbance not as the negation of motion, but as the state of per- 
ception and thought which is affected by, or in touch with, nature as it need be- 
not unnecessarily complicated or turbulent. What is unnecessary is striking the 
wrong attitude about what is necessary or attempting to escape it; shunning such 
evasive manoeuvres maintains a place within life free for perception and thought. 
Taken to the extreme, as Striker contends in her last sentence, one may even see 
the sense of attributing blessedness to pain and suffering in that there is an object- 
less pleasure in not being disturbed by an incidence of harm. These are, however, 
dimensions of Epicurus' thought that take us beyond the central issue, that is to 
say, the immanent character of calm and blessedness.46 
Epicurean calm is, thus, a motion and not the cancellation of motion; it is a spe- 
cial, selective, right kind of motion. Calm is a balanced or harmonious motion, 
where no extreme is bred, invited, or likely to seduce. The value of the weather 
and of the motion of bodies as matters for philosophical reflection, in the sense of 
practical human deliberation, is that we learn about the true pattern of things and 
(therefore) our own true pattern. Being able to  understand and appreciate the 
coming to be and passing away of things allows the coming and passing of our 
desires to be better regulated; our goals become more realistic and more real. 
Such purported benefits to a practical philosophy seem trite and obvious when 
stated concisely, without their details, and this is as it should be, since "[lle rCel est 
plein de dCtail~."4~ Epicurus' message concerning the weather is one and the same: 
all is in the details; there is no one story of lightning, but there is this one and this 
one and this one, many possible events, many cases. The detail will tell, not the 
escape into a fantastic, simple, cloud. Naturalism in this sense is a patient and 
complex empiricism, a practical philosophy of the new and the many, aware of the 
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need for selection and setting the right course, but answering that need within 
nature, and not, impossibly, through its transcendence. 
m. Thomas Hobbes on Natural Human Turbulence 
From Epicurean "true physics," wherein the individual's ethical relation to the 
world is derived from a study of natural turbulence and calm, we move to a more 
modern use of nature for ethical and political ends, namely Thomas Hobbes' 
Leviathan. Where Epicurus' philosophy is most concerned with the well being of 
the individual, the value in contemplating and speculating about nature lies, for 
Hobbes, in its general social and political consequences. The Hobbesian theory of 
the social and stipulative character of ethics and justice, or, in other words, the 
creation of obligations by way of forming contracts, is modelled on a theory of the 
state of nature. Hobbes' state of nature is a largely undesirable state, which is 
warded off by the almost magical creation of another world, namely, the political 
commonwealth. 
Hobbes does not believe that the state of nature may ever be cancelled or fully 
repressed, since it is not an empirical or historical form to begin with. The state of 
nature is a hypothesis, more like a possible future state that would become proba- 
ble if we abandoned our social and political artifice. The state of nature, for 
Hobbes, exists side by side with society, or, even more strongly, makes society pos- 
sible in that the sovereign power must remain within the state of nature in order to 
enforce the contracts of civil and political life. The realms of ethics and positive 
law have purely magical status unless they are accompanied by the threat of war 
which the state of nature, in the body of the sovereign, represents. In the state of 
nature anything and everything is possible, including the stipulation of regulatory 
and restrictive laws and codes as well as the condition of violence which produces 
respect for what is stipulated. Hobbes' inclusion of the state of nature within the 
social contract and the political commonwealth shows the interrelation and inter- 
connectedness of the two spheres. Later forms of social contract theory, as well as 
other types of moral philosophy, tend to make the good, the valuable, and the just 
entirely social phenomena, but it is to Hobbes' credit that he maintains the state of 
nature within the commonwealth as the condition of possibility for ethics and law. 
If ethics and law are not anchored, somehow, to nature then they are truly magi- 
cal, creations from nothing. Hobbes' ingenuity is to make the social and political 
realms only pseudo-magical, by grounding their imperatives in a sovereign force, 
which is both within the hypothetical state of nature and serves to bring about 
common social life. 
Hobbes' contract form and its double connection to nature and society will be 
taken up later by Michel Serres in his own thinking of the natural contract as the 
general form by which the spheres of nature and society, in their entirety, enter 
into an ethical or legal relation. Both Hobbes and Serres are inspired to think the 
relation of nature and society by the weather. Serres, as we shall see, conceives of 
the weather as linked essentially to time (du temps) and weather and time both 
bring together society and nature. For Hobbes, war is our human nature and peace 
is the civilized, socially contracted removal of war. 
What is, what could be, a removal of war, a removal of nature? Hobbes' solu- 
tion to the problem of nature is no escape, properly speaking, no closure of nat- 
ural process, but its containment, a segregation: war, nature, is limited to one, to 
the sovereign, and the maintenance of the natural condition in a limited place, the 
select highest place within the commonwealth, is necessary for law and sociality to 
be possible. Hobbes' sovereign must remain in the condition of war if the citizenry 
are to benefit from nature's removal. And war, for Hobbes, is a storm, and peace is 
thought as the calm between storms. 
In the crucial and short thirteenth chapter of Leviathan, "The Natural1 Condi- 
tion of Mankind," Hobbes describes the condition of "Warre of every one against 
every one" by reference to the weather: 
. . . the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the 
nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two 
of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together: So the nature of War, 
consisteth not in actual1 fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all 
the time there is no asurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.48 
Hobbes' thought of war as the disposition or inclination toward disturbance, and, 
correlatively, of peace as the absence of disturbance, or calm, are similar to Epi- 
curean views, though not Hobbes' attitude to turbulence nor his conception of calm. 
We do not see, in this face or act, our natural condition. The natural condition 
is a hypothesis, not some matter of fact state or set of properties. For Hobbes, one 
must consider the character of time in thinking of the natural condition. The tem- 
poral and hypothetical dimensions of the natural condition rule out sensory or 
empirical confirmation of its character. The place of the state of nature as the 
ground of our contractual obligations makes it difficult to conceive of it as merely 
stipulative. The state of nature must be approached, accordingly, by a combination 
of observation and modelling. The scientist of human life should observe, accord- 
ing to Hobbes, the behaviour of others but judge according to his own knowledge 
of his self; such a study is a good one when one's own case is extended well or 
applies generally to others, that is, when one is able to hit upon what is essential 
rather than accidental. 
One arrives, according to Hobbes, at knowledge concerning our warlike nature 
via a series of intuitions of differing complexity, at the far end intuitions concern- 
ing what we would do under certain circumstances. Such judgements are sup- 
ported only by appeal to what we have seen others do in similar circumstances and 
what we see in ourselves as capacities for action. The similarities between the 
requirements of good political science and meteorology are readily apparent. 
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Hobbes' use of the term "inclination" indicates a series of events among 
humans and clouds connected in ways other than simple entailment or necessary 
connection. An inclination is a tendency rather than a universal and necessary law. 
The sciences of persons and of weather are, in other words, complex and taxing 
for they deal with tendencies rather than universal laws. Universal laws have bear- 
ing in these realms, but that they are insufficient as accounts of phenomena; they 
are too general and indiscriminate and need supplement, detail, context, particu- 
larity. An inclination or tendency, furthermore, is a probability, a likelihood, a 
proximity to a result in a certain neighbourhood; as Hobbes indicates, sometimes 
it turns into something worse and sometimes it does not. The uncertain or variable 
character of inclination is absolutely necessary for Hobbes' account: without it his 
story of the natural condition of mankind would be inconceivable; the threat of 
violence by the sovereign must be perpetually potential while only occasionally 
actualized. An inclination is like an essence but differs from such in being closer to 
the phenomenon it is meant to explain. An essence, from the perspective of a phi- 
losophy of transcendence or theology, is or may be disconnected from its expres- 
sion. An inclination approximates an essence in its ideality as a probability or 
disposition; yet an inclination is only as an extension or inference from its expres- 
sions and would not exist without such. In other words, foul weather is not some 
essence separate from calm or storm, nor is the natural human condition entirely 
distinct from social occasions or violent brawls. Dispositions or inclinations are 
virtual states, ambiguous and probabilistic, yet real; they are about to be in gen- 
eral though they may not be in this time or that; sometimes they fail to manifest 
themselves at all but usually they do. 
Hobbes begins his analogy between war and storms with the complication of 
time. Time is given extensive consideration throughout his epi~temology.~9 Intro- 
ducing the complication of time means that our consideration of the nature of 
something, be it weather or war, must define that thing not merely in terms of the 
inherence of one or more properties in a substance, but in a dispositional or ten- 
dential way, as what something is probable to do. An inclination, accordingly, is 
not an "actual" incident or two, or three, but a "known disposition," which is 
equated with "an inclination thereto of many days together". The incline within a 
plurality that is manifested in some kind of regular or significant pattern is the 
'nature' Hobbes seeks. And in this realm, he finds weather and human character 
to be alike: each is distinguished between clearly positive and negative forms 
(calm, peace; storms, war) and each is often found in a mixed condition (about to 
clear, about to burst), thus making its character difficult to comprehend. 
In The Gift of Fear, Gavin de Becker tells of the technologies of intuition for 
regaining perception of fear (contrary to civilized reason and judgement) in an 
attempt to fathom the beginning of the event of violence and so avoid or temper it. 
The seemingly abstract philosophical question, "What is an event, when does it 
begin?" is, in this light, a supremely practical affair, meaning, perhaps, the difference 
between life and death. The answer to the question again hinges on the notion of 
inclination, when something starts to happen even though it need not but is likely 
to. Something violent happening is not the result of something special or missing, 
according to de Becker: "With the man who goes on a shooting spree at work, it is 
not that he has some mysterious extra component or that he necessarily has some- 
thing missing. It is usually the balance and interaction of the same ingredients that 
influence us all."50 This fits with Hobbesian method concerning knowledge of 
human nature: the potential for violence is in us and may be known by observa- 
tion and self-reflection. Similarly, de Becker argues that only upon a comparison 
between our motivations and those of our potential attacker may we well predict 
an encounter. The onset of violence is an inclination within an intensification of 
an ordinary process, a weighting, a quorum, a quantum, a threshold of what is 
common. This having been said, it is still difficult to predict the onset of such an 
event, because of the looping effect by which the beginning takes on a character 
only in relation with that which follows, for example, the act of violence. If the 
beginning led to something else, as it could have done, then it would not have 
been a beginning of this, violent, event. The difficulty of reading warning signs 
may thus be expressed as the difficulty of separating pre-incident indicators from 
the incident: "[p]rediction moves from a science to an art when you realize that 
pre-incident indicators are actually part of the incident."sI A more general way of 
expressing this feature of the problem is in terms of the context of violence, the 
meeting of persons, which de Becker characterizes as necessarily interactionalsz: 
something is not fully what it is until it has been met by something else. 
IV. War and Peace; Storms, Interludes, and Harmonies 
In his Le contrat naturel, Serres adopts much of Hobbes' thought concerning the 
link between ethics and contracts, but argues with the Englishman concerning the 
field within which contracts may be formed, forcing an extension from the social 
to the natural. The turn to the natural has many reasons, from the soil upon which 
the pugilistic subjects of Hobbesian thought stand to the environmental catastro- 
phes of mass social production in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Nature, 
conceived as the whole system of interactions of things and processes on the earth, 
is a close synonym for weather. 
Climate expresses the interface of nature and society. Changes in the weather 
are highly complex and require thought of multiple possible times. For Serres, phi- 
losophy is the thought of time, and as such, it is also the thought of weather, for 
both are conceptions of the possible. Serres joins Hobbes in his insight into the 
link between weather and time (for which one term in French suffices, du temps). 
Yet Serres' attitude is more like that of Epicurus. For Hobbes, the storm and the 
natural battle of human beings must be removed, and their absence is defined as 
peace. For Serres, war forms part of social transcendence or removal, such that 
society and war are implicated and war and nature are dislocated. A social contract 
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is a war on nature. Peace is not just the absence of social war but the end of the war 
on nature. War, law, and society are akin. Peace is not the absence of war but the 
absence of the belief in the mutual exclusivity of society and nature. As Epicurean 
calm is not a stasis outside natural turbulence, so peace, for Serres, is no escape 
through the mirage of a self-constituting life achievable by society and law. The nat- 
ural contract is the thought of the relation of the social and natural, the right har- 
mony between different forms of turbulence. 
Thinking the natural contract, the possibility of peace through the relation 
between nature and society, is the function of philosophy as the thought of time 
and the possible, the ethical act. '11 y va de la Terre, dans sa totalitC, comme des 
hommes, dans leur ensemble. L'histoire globale entre dans la nature; la nature 
globale entre dans I'histoire: voila de I'inCdit en philosophie."53 
Human activity has become globalized, through our sheer mass in the twenty- 
first century, what Serres refers to as the becoming material of the human. The 
massification of humanity on the scale of tectonic plates may be seen in technolo- 
gies of globalized communication, rapid speed, and intensive natural resource 
extraction and waste. The power of human activity is found primarily in the mass, 
the collective system of humans, be it in our numbers, the aggregation of the 
effects of individual acts of high numbers of persons, or the effects of highly inten- 
sified and organized human activity in the form of technology. The massification 
of human activity does not mean that individual acts of persons are no longer sig- 
nificant. Jumping to such a conclusion assumes an answer to the problem of aggre- 
gation, or how something becomes a mass of significant proportion. Human 
power is today a threat to the earth as a whole, natural system; human capacities 
have global level effects and are expressed in globalized dimensions. Such global 
effects as expressions of human activity are not ordinarily features of single per- 
sons but do pass, necessarily, through persons, in some cases a few (for example, 
nuclear reactors), in some cases many (like human waste). That such effects pass 
through persons does not place us in the same realm as a conducting material, 
though that potential exists, that is, humans may serve merely as forms through 
which effects are transmitted, but this would be so only as an abnegation of 
another power of persons, that is to say, our existence as generative causes, most 
commonly know as our ability to choose or decide. 
With respect to the two types of global activity outlined above (effects of massi- 
fication, effects of intensive and organized human labour) the single person may 
play a generative role in different ways. For example, I may choose not to eat cer- 
tain substances or I may choose not to work in certain fields. Such decisions may 
be mundane but it is the massification of mundane features which gives rise to 
global effects of human activity in the first place, under one of its forms. More tra- 
ditionally significant social and political acts also have effects of a global sort 
(constructing a world court, spreading news across global communication sys- 
tems) but they are not the only ones to do so: knowing this is important if one 
thinks singular activity is significant within human massification and not only on 
the basis of giant capital or technological ownership. 
The study of complex systems like the weather shows that a single component 
or set of components may have a significant effect on the whole, and, vice versa, 
that the whole as such also has effects on its parts. The individual, ethical 
encounter with complex global systems-be they weather patterns, networks of 
capital or technological equipment, or highly sophisticated, multidisciplinary and 
transdisciplinary sciences-must be aware that such systems function unlike indi- 
vidual agents, yet their global or world-object status does not remove them from 
the domain in which individual actions matter. The issue of massification or aggre- 
gation is the problem of how something complex is constructed in time. And here 
the weather shows us that there are many possible constructions. The individual 
agent, together with local and global sets of such agents, is capable of having an 
effect on the whole. We need to exercise such control if the effects of the mass of 
humanity are not to destroy the earth. The natural contract is a proposal concern- 
ing the coupling and regulation of two highly complex systems, nature and soci- 
ety, such that they may co-exist in the whole. The weather expresses the turbulence 
of their encounter. The thought of time allows prediction of disaster and construc- 
tion of peace. 
The value of nature is the source of all value. Events that are perceived as events 
are complex processes that teach perception and calculation. The value of nature is 
the source of all value as that in whch we dwell, as beauty: "fitre meme de beauti, 
rien n'est aussi beau que le monde; rien de beau ne se produit sans ce donateur 
gracieux de toutes les magnificences."s4 
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